COMPARATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO MEDIA ACCESS TO COURT PROCEEDINGS

SPEAKER 1:

Conference The Court of Public Opinion, The Practice and
Ethics of Trying Cases in the Media. This is day two of our
conference, and we have a very full day. The first panel
we’re going to hear from this morning will be on
comparative law. We’ll then have a panel on Institutional
Response to Crisis. We have a lunch panel on Living Through
Lacrosse which will be followed by remarks from President
Brodhead who will be joining us for part of that panel and
then for his comments. Then we have a panel on the Role and
Responsibility of the Public, and our last panel will be
the Role and Responsibility of the Court.

We are delighted that C-SPAN is here today and they will be
filming this panel, The Comparative Law panel and they will
be filming the judges’ panel as well. They’re going to have
their stuff setup throughout the day, but they will be
filming those panels and we expect we may also have media
coverage of the lunch time panel and of the President’s
speech. So we ask your indulgence for the lights and we
hope that you’ll be here for the whole day with us. And I’m
going turn it over now to our first panel.
BIGNAMI:

Welcome to this morning’s panel on Comparative Media law.

Yesterday evening Howard Schneider argued that the remedy
for episodes like the Duke Lacrosse case is the public;
educating the public to be critical consumers of the news.
And I hope I’m not putting words in the mouths of today’s
panelists, but at least some of them, I think, will tell us
that the solution is instead comparative law.

Looking to how the law in other countries resolves the
conflict between speech and fair, unbiased court
proceedings, what types of restrictions on the press do
other countries employ to ensure that defendants get a fair
trial? And what types of restrictions do other countries
employ to ensure that the reputation of innocent defendants
is not irreparably damaged in the course of legal
proceedings?

To bring this forum perspective, we have experts on
European and Canadian law on today’s panel, and we also
have Lucy Daglish to reflect on all of this from an
American perspective.

Giorgio Resta sitting on my left is Associate Professor of
Comparative Law at the University of Bari in Italy. He has
written numerous books on comparative privacy law. He has

taught at universities throughout Europe and Latin America.
Professor Resta will focus on the national laws of
continental Europe. He will also discuss some of the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights. And for those of
you who are not international lawyers, the European Court
of Human Rights is an international tribunal located in
Strasbourg with jurisdiction over 47 countries including
Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Turkey, and other
places.

Sitting to his left is Gavin Phillipson. He comes from the
other Durham. The one that’s a little bit older than this
one. He’s Professor of Law at the University of Durham. He
has written numerous books and articles on civil liberties
under UK law and the European Convention on Human Rights.
And his work was cited in a 2004 opinion by the House of
Lords in the absolutely groundbreaking case of Naomi
Campbell. That case established for the first time a right
to privacy under UK law. Professor Phillipson will be
focusing in UK law and the European Convention of Human
Rights.

To his left is Peter Jacobsen who will fill us in on
Canadian law; coming closer to home here. He is partner

with a Toronto firm of Bersenas, Jacobsen, Chouest,
Thomson, Blackburn. His experience on these legal issues is
vast. He represents a variety of print and electronic media
clients.

And then we return metaphorically speaking to the United
States with Lucy Dalglish. And she is the Executive
Director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press. As such, she is one of the country’s leading
advocates of freedom of the press.

Each of the speakers will have 15 minutes for their
presentations. They will speak in the order in which I just
presented them. This is designed to start with the most
foreign system, the civil law in continental Europe, and
gradually work our way back to the United States. And the
time that remains, which will be about 15 minutes, will for
questions and open debate. And I hope debate on how
appropriate European law is for the United States as a way
of handling future episodes like the Duke Lacrosse case. So
I turn it over to Professor Resta.
RESTA:

Thank you very much Professor Bignami. I’m really grateful
for the invitation to the entire Conference Committee and
to Kathryn Bradley particular. And I’m really it’s an honor

and a pleasure for me to be here. The discussion from
yesterday was extremely interesting from my point of view.
And I prepared a paper for that would be later given to the
conference materials, but I will not read it, because
otherwise it’s going to take too long, so I hope you will
forgive my many possible English mistakes. I will try to
make my best.

I would like to raise a question and make basically three
points starting from an issue that was discussed yesterday
evening in the panel about the role of the prosecutor.
Professor Metzloff was asking yesterday evening whether it
would not be desirable to change the ABA Rules by stating
openly and expressly that prosecutors have to respect the
presumption of innocence of the defendant in a criminal
case. It was like a provocative question, but I think it
has some general meaning that we should really take
seriously in a comparative perspective.

The point I’d like to make is the question I’d like to
raise is exactly this one. In a context in which there is a
strong competition on the part of the newspaper, on the
part of the press, on the part of the broadcasts, in a
context in which the communication of information is

growing, in which the freedom of speech is often exercised
more on commercial concerns than on public interest
concerns, and in a context in which the power of the media
in framing your opinion is undisputable, does it make
really sense -- is it socially desirable -- that we think
of the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial only as
limited to the radical relationship between the citizen and
the state? And in particular what is the meaning in this
social context of the presumption of innocence?

Presumption of innocence is so defined by the European
Convention of Human Rights in Article 6 related to the fair
trial, it’s stated that everyone charged with a criminal
offense should be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law. So what is this? Is this just a
procedural guarantee limited to the relationship between
the defendant in a criminal trial and the judicial
authorities? Are other public authorities bound by the
presumption of innocence? And then should it just be only a
principle limited to the vertical relationship or should we
think of the presumption of innocence in terms of a right
to respect of the presumption of innocence that should be
opposable to third parties and then lead to private parties
and the media?

This may sound as a provocative question, because we know
from the constitutional theory that all these rights should
basically be limited to relationship between the citizens
and the state, but the comparative constitutional law can
teach us that this is not the only way of looking at the
constitutional protections. And in particular if we look at
the evolution of European law in the last years, in the
last ten years at least, my impression is that we can
observe a progressive move, a progressive shift from the
presumption of innocence conceived only as a principle, as
a procedural safeguard to a right, a right that has to be
respected also by the private parties.

Let me just give a couple of examples taken from the case
law of the European Court of Human Rights. I hope I will
have time to come back, but just to give you some concrete
sense of what I mean. These two cases are attached in the
conference materials.

The first one is the decision (Inaudible) v. France. It’s a
decision of 1995 of the European Court of Human Rights. In
this decision France was condemned to pay damages to a
businessman for a violation of his rights to respect of

presumption of innocence. The fact of the case he was
arrested in 1979 for the murder of a member of Parliament
and former Minister, (Inaudible). Two days later during a
press conference the Minister of the Interior and Senior
Police Officer stated in absolute terms that the case was
solved and that the authors of the crime were arrested just
a couple of days after the arrest.

(Inaudible) was described as one of the instigators of the
murder. At trial he was eventually acquitted and sued the
state for pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. His claim was
dismissed in France, but accepted by the European Court of
Human Rights on the ground that presumption of innocence.
One of the elements of a fair criminal trial in Article 6
of the European Convention is not only a procedural
guarantee, but also a right that has to be respected by all
public authorities. Not only the judicial authorities,
because here it was an act made by the police and the
Minister of Interior and it was outside the criminal trial.
And this is a first important move. We see the presumption
of innocence that goes outside from the original criminal
rules.

And the second decision was another important decision

(Inaudible) v. (Inaudible) I’ll come back later on, but
(inaudible) another decision that can give a sense of this
transforming idea of presumption of innocence. And it’s
(Inaudible) v. Austria. A decision of 2000 also attached to
conference materials.

Here the Austrian courts had issued injunctions prohibiting
the reproduction of the likeness of a right-wing extremist
arrested on the suspicion of having sent several letter
bombs in connection with an article reporting on his
terrorist campaign. These injunctions were granted on the
basis of the Copyright Act and the Media Act, which grants
every citizen the right to respect of presumption of
innocence as regards also private parties.

It is stated in this Article 7 that if in any media a
person suspected of having committed an offense punishable
by the courts but not yet finally convicted is presented as
having already been found guilty or as author of such
punishable offense and not only as a suspect, the person
affected is entitled to claim indemnity from the media
owner for the injury suffered. And there are similar
provisions also in France that give injunctions in these
situations.

Well, in this decision of the European Court of Human
Rights recognized that injunctions were intended to protect
the defendant against insulting defamation and against
violations of the presumption of innocence, and therefore,
they pursued legitimate aims according to Article 10 that
guarantees the freedom of the press of the Convention.
However, in a proportionality test they were considered
over-broad and not proportionate to the aims pursued.

This case we have a protection of the freedom of the press
made by the European Court of Human Rights, but it wasn’t
made just on the proportionality test. In other decisions
these injunctions and these compensatory damages were
upheld by The Court, reasoning that presumption of
innocence is a right that has to be protected by the State.
So we see in this perspective a changing idea of changing
meaning of presumption of innocence.

But in order to understand the implications and the
premises of this move in the European law, we should
probably put into context all of this discussion about the
relationship between the media and the law in a comparative
perspective.

I would like to distinguish three theoretical models of
coping with the problem of court related speech. Usually in
the comparative literature, only two models are
distinguished. A pick-up distinction made by (Inaudible) in
his book on Courts, Speech, and the Constitutions, which
reflects a view widely shared in the literature.

Under the first model called The Scrutiny of Government
Model, any limitation of media freedom to access and
comment upon judicial proceeding is seen as prima facia
suspect or unlawful. If an exceptional situation in the
exercise of the freedom of the press results in an obstacle
to the fairness of the proceedings, the legal system seeks
not to punish the party causing prejudice, but rather
resource to remedial devices such as voir dire, judicial
sequestration, change of venue, as you know, retrials,
aimed at mutualizing or diminishing the impact of adverse
publicity. And this is clearly the American model after the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Price and
Shepherd v. Max.

The second model, the Administration of Justice Model,
takes media threats to referrings of the proceedings more

seriously. As a consequence it’s subject to the exercise of
the freedom of the press to stricter constraints. The
individual and societal interest in an unimpeded
administration of justice are given much more weight than
the values served by an unlimited freedom of speech.
Accordingly, instead of resulting only to expose remedial
devices, this model makes extensive use of criminal
sanctions in order to deter disclosure of facts or
statements of opinions which would pose serious risks to
the fairness of the proceedings or would diminish public
confidence in the administration of justice. And this is
typically the common law approach under the law of content
that we can see in all the common law countries outside of
the United States, as probably also Professor Phillipson
could clarify about England.

But this distinction from my perspective is widely shared
in the literature is lacking to some points. First because
it’s a statical distinction and we see a legal system are
always evolving and the evolution that is interest, for
example, the English, United Kingdom, and Canada legal
system to some sort, to some extent, has reduced the divide
with the American approach, even though the American
solution is quite isolated in a common law perspective.

The second point is that this distinction reflects just a
common law jurisdiction approach. But we have to consider
that in civil law jurisdictions we don’t have many
institutional factors that make the problem of the
relationship fair trial/free press so difficult, because in
our civil law jurisdictions there is no political role of
the prosecutor. The prosecutor is usually a civil servant,
but does not run for reelection. Second, we don’t have all
lady juries. We have a mix of courts, a mix of juries. We
have professional judges that decide together with lay
assessors. And third, we have different rules on evidence
that make the publication of some information less
important to the proceedings.

So to some point our concern is not so much with the
fairness of the proceeding that could be put in danger by
adverse media publicity, but on other points. And
particularly on the dignitary interest of the person who
are involved in the trial. And this is another perspective,
another way of looking at the same problem dependant on the
particular institutional factors that are in play in the
civil law jurisdiction.

I don’t have time to come too much into details, but I
would like just to state that in our perspective, we have
basically three way of approaching to the problems of media
adverse publicity. The first one is the criminal sanctions
directed at preserving the pretrial secrets. Of course, you
have to consider that we have inquisitorial models of the
criminal proceedings so the secrecy of the investigation is
an important point of the entire procedure.

And the secrecy of the investigation is protected basically
for under two rationales. The first is the efficiency of
the investigation, and the second is the protection of
presumption of innocence, because if some notices are put
into public domains that could involve some statements of
guilty on the parties to the proceedings, this could have,
of course, some many reputation effects.

But these criminal sanctions in practice are not so much
applied, because the public has a lot of interest in
knowing about the ongoing proceedings. So even taking some
risks, the press tends to publish information that’s secret
under these provisions.

The second approach that is more efficient than the first

one resorts to private law remedies. In particular
injunctions and damages for the violation of the person
(inaudible) rights of the suspect and of the accused and,
of course, the witnesses and victim. We have, I already
cited, provisions in Austria, but also in France. They
amended the (inaudible) in order to state that presumption
of innocence has to be respected by the press and the Judge
can issue injunctions and can order rectification right to
reply if a person is publically stated as guilty before a
final conviction. And this makes a different shift, a
different move respect traditional defamation law, because
if you think of the right to respect of presumption of
innocence, usually in defamation law you have the defense
of the truth of the allegations. Presumption of innocence
can be violated even though the person is eventually
convicted, because the rationale of the right to respect of
presumption of innocence is that there should be no trial
by media. The real trial should be in The Court.

The third way of coping with problem of a court related
speech restraint is self-regulation. And self-regulation is
widely adopted in Europe on the part of the press and on
the part of the persons involved in the -- the public
officials involved in the proceeding. But let me just quote

a provision of the German press corp of self-regulation
just to give you some sense of what’s going on in Europe.
It’s called The Presumption of Innocence and it’s stated
that, “Reports on investigations, criminal court
proceedings, and other formal procedures must be free from
prejudice. The principle of the presumption of innocence
also applies to the press.” And this is stated by the same
press agencies. And then I go to some interesting
guidelines, but I’ve no time to explain them, just remand
to the paper.

The third point that I wanted to make, but at the moment I
have no time, in case in the discussion is that the
European Court of Human Rights has tried to strike a
balance between this strong national commitment to
protection of presumption of innocence and the freedom of
the press. Because if you take a look at the Convention of
the Human Rights, here you see that freedom of the press,
first of all, is not absolute, is not framed in absolute
terms as the First Amendment in the US, but has some
restrictions devoted, for example, to the protection of the
reputation or to the protection of the authority and
impartiality of the judicial. And there are many important
decisions by European Court of Human Rights from Sunday

Times in (Inaudible) v. Austria that have said that
sometimes the State can punish the press for violating the
right to fair trial and for violating the right to private
life. So there are some arising ways a tendency in Europe
to overcome the idea that as did the King in old times the
press can do no wrong. The press can do wrong, and has to
some sense to be controlled in order to accomplish this
important task of informing the public and scrutinizing the
way in which justice is administered. Thanks.
BIGNAMI:

Professor Phillipson.

PHILLIPSON:

I’d like to thank Duke Law School and Kathy Bradley in
particular for inviting me to this conference as well. It’s
been fantastic to be here. I’ve been incredibly well looked
after in the wonderful Duke Inn and it’s been wonderfully
organized and fascinating, so I hope you won’t think me
ungrateful if I respond by being slightly critical of the
American approach in this area. In fact, it’s really more
of a kind of critical analysis, I suppose, of First
Amendment jurisprudence informed by comparative
considerations than anything else.

The US Supreme Court once referred to the right to a fair
trial as the most fundamental of all freedoms. Much of this
conference has examined the failings of the media and

prosecutors in relation to the coverage of suspects and
their trials. But the argument of my paper is that the
courts must also take some responsibility for failing to
uphold this freedom. And this failure, I suggest, results
in part from an excessive concern in American rights
discourse about the threat to liberty posed by the State
with a concomitant blindness towards the threat opposed by
powerful private actors; in this case, of course, the
media. So I will critique the role of the courts in this
area by taking a comparative perspective contrasting the
absolutism of First Amendment jurisprudence with the more
balanced and nuanced approach taken in many other Western
democracies.

Since the Duke Lacrosse case and other numerous other cases
in the lower courts also concerned the destruction damaged
the reputation and privacy of suspects. I’ll also make a
brief mention of invasion of privacy and defamation in
English law now heavily influenced by the European
Convention of Human Rights under the Human Rights Act.

My starting point is that the activities of sections of the
media in cases like the Duke Lacrosse case are instants in
which far from performing their legitimate and vital role

in the democracy, they betray it. And this betrayal can
have devastating consequences for the individual. In the
Sam Shepherd case of which we’ve already heard, (Inaudible)
comments, “The press saturated the community with highly
inflammatory, inaccurate, and inadmissible information.”
Shepherd was convicted. The conviction was eventually
overturned, but by then he had spent ten years in prison,
he had lost his medical license, he had become an
alcoholic, and he died within four years of his eventual
acquittal.

Such examples to me represent a betrayal by the press of
the First Amendment’s purpose as lives and liberty are
destroyed in the pursuit of stories that sell. More
importantly, perhaps, this is accompanied by stubborn
refusal in most American legal discourse to reassess the
current approach to the First Amendment in the light of
such appalling misuses of the license it grants. The
refusal which from the outside looks like a kind of blind
faith, a dogmatic attachment which seems to forget why we
owned these free speech in the first place and thus risks
reducing the First Amendment in (Inaudible) phrase to a
purposeless obstruction.

In a recent book I’ve argued in the modern media age under
the pressure of the 24/7 news environment and the
extraordinary cult of celebrity we should be ready to ask
afresh, does unrestrained media freedom now always serve
the goals of free speech. My answer is an emphatic no. I
would argue that the uses made of our freedom by the media
can often directly undermine the values which underlie the
right to free speech itself, human dignity, the search for
truth, and the basic foundations of a democratic society
amongst which must be the rule of law as expressed in the
individual’s right to a fair trial. So restricting the
media can actually, I would argue, uphold the values
underlying free speech.

Let me give you one example. One of the most influential
contemporary defenses of freedom of speech is Ronald
Walkins arguing for moral autonomy. Based upon the
foundational principles, the government must treat all
citizens with equal concern and respect. It supports the
right to freedom of speech in order to prevent unpopular
points of view from being suppressed, because state actors
or majorities find them distasteful or offensive. However,
where speech is restrained in order to protect fairness of
a trial, the State is acting not from such an illegitimate

motive, but rather in order to secure equally for all the
right of access to a fair trial.

Such restrictions upon free speech do not, therefore,
infringe the basic principle on which free speech itself is
founded, for if the fair trial of an individual is
arbitrarily affected by prejudicial media comment because
that individual is accused of a crime that happens to have
caught the media or public attention then the State has
failed to secure equal access to justice. Therefore, the
very same rationale underpinning free speech, the notion of
the State’s duty to treat its citizens with equal concern
and respect, in this case requires the restriction of the
media.

Of the English approach forms a strong contrast of that of
the US. While valuing free speech strongly as a vital
aspect of a healthy democracy and an important individual
right, The Courts and Parliaments are clear that such
freedom does not extend to the prejudicing of trials. Thus
once a suspect has been charged or arrested, though not
before, the rules of the contempt of court Act 1991 are
then activated. The publication of material which creates
“a substantial risk of serious prejudice” to the

forthcoming proceedings is a criminal offense and
exceptionally prior restraints to prevent such coverage may
also be used.

This is in harmony with the approach of the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In the leading case of
(Inaudible)/Austria mentioned by Giorgio just said the
limits of permissible comment in the media may not extend
to statements which are likely to prejudice -- whether
intentionally or not -- the chances of a person receiving a
fair trial. I would submit as a fairly widespread consensus
outside the US that this is the proper approach. There is
no legitimate right to prejudice another’s trial through
speech. To do so is not an exercise, but an abuse of human
rights.

Now, of course it will be said that I’m missing the point.
American courts do not believe that fair trial rights are
not important, they simply find other ways to protect them
without restricting the media. But do these methods work?
My reading of the available research suggests that there
are reasons to be skeptical. The belief that current
methods of neutralizing prejudicial coverage are
satisfactory I think is complacent, and that complacency

seems to be particularly strong amongst the judiciary.

Many of whom appear to be unaware of the empirical research
in the area and to place an exaggerated faith in their own
authority and persuasiveness as a means of neutralizing
through jury directions any prejudice in the jury resulting
from media coverage. It’s not perhaps surprising that
judges think this way as Howard Schneider so strongly
emphasized last night in that fascinating and challenging
speech. People found it very difficult to accept evidence
which contradicts their cherished beliefs. And what belief
can be more dear to the Judge than the notion his own writ
runs clear through his own court unimpeded by the media or
anyone else.

So what is the evidence to suggest that we should be
skeptical? The key point that the research has revealed is
that it is not so much expressions of opinion in the media
that are damaging, but revelations of fact, particularly if
inadmissible evidence is disclosed to the public.

A major Australian study found that jurors can put opinions
but not revelations of fact out of their minds. Joann
Bradward in an article in the New York University Law

Review summarizes the US research as finding that reports
of previous convictions and recounted or other inadmissible
confessions creates a persistent bias in the minds of
perspective jurors. Steve (Inaudible) noted that in one
study more than 72 percent of jurors exposed to stories
containing inadmissible evidence voted to convict, whereas
less than 44 percent of those not exposed did so.

For example, in the case (Inaudible) a local media had
revealed a previous murder conviction and indications of a
confession to the second murder charge. The trial court
impaneled a jury despite the fact that eight out of 14 of
them admitted that at some point they had formed an
impression of the guilt of the accused. The Supreme Court
refused to overturn that conviction.

Hal Haddon says in his litigation article that the press
believes it has the First Amendment right to access and
publish every scrap of potential evidence inadmissible or
not well before trial. Now this cannot only risk
prejudicing the trial, it also attacks the rule of law more
directly. The Supreme Court itself noted that the exclusion
of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news
evidence make it available to the public. It makes -- as an

English commentator has put it -- a nonsense of the rules
of evidence. And as Frederick Sharrows observed no lawyer
has the right to evade the rules of evidence and procedure
designed to produce a fair trial by holding a press
conference in which he leaks to the media the inadmissible
evidence which he cannot put in court. It’s hard to see why
the media should have this right.

So what about neutralizing measures? The most common -simply admonishing the jury to disregard what they’ve heard
in the media -- is seemingly the least affective. As Judge
Learned Hand put it to comply with an instruction to
disregard key evidence revealed in the press would require
a mental gymnastics, which is beyond not only the jurors’
powers, but anybody else’s.

In the United States and Davis a Judge remarked when one is
told don’t think of elephants, the immediate image in one’s
mind is an elephant. So goes the effectiveness of
instructions to disregard. Justice Jackson put it pretty
succinctly. The naïve assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing
law is known to be unmitigated fiction.

Other measures carry no guarantee of success and raise
their own problems. Sequestration of the jury places huge
burdens on jurors in long trials and moreover can do
nothing about the effects of pretrial publicity. Delay of
the trial is the least satisfactory remedy. Then is the
trial less likely to be able to do justice with the fading
of relevant events from witnesses’ minds. But it also -- as
(Inaudible) pointed out -- is contrary to the guarantee of
a prompt trial in the Sixth Amendment and in Article 6 of
the European Convention.

In the age of the internet, moving trials to different
venues in response to prejudicial coverage in a particular
area may no longer be effective. When newspapers keep
archives of back issues obtainable on the internet, jurors
who did not read about initial coverage may decide to
access them and read about them when they are called.

Moreover in the instance of the case that’s attracted
sustained national coverage, it may be difficult or
impossible to find jurors who have not seen it. If you can,
you may, as been pointed out, be limiting your jury
selection to the uninformed and the ill-educated.

In any event research has found that jurors cannot reliably
assess their own potential prejudice. As O’Connors put it
this was not surprising. Asking a potential juror whether
he or she can be impartial is a little like asking a
practicing alcoholic if he has his drinking under control.
We’re asking the person who has the prejudice to discern if
the prejudice will affect his decision.

So my conclusion is you can’t be sure that these methods
will work and you may, therefore, be condemning suspects to
unfair trials. And, of course, pretrial publicity is often
also defamatory as in the lacrosse case itself. The
treatment of this area in English law, again, forms a
contrast to the US approach. Under what is known as
Reynolds Privilege, there is a defense for communicating
information on a story of real public concern or real
public interest which goes beyond that concerning political
figures. But whereas New York Times and Sullivan grants a
privilege which in the absence of malice applies per se to
a category of stories those about public figures regardless
of journalistic conduct.

In contrast under English law UK journalist can never avoid
liability and libel simply by pointing to the importance of

the story and the fact that it concerns a public figure. In
every instance it must be shown additionally that the media
took reasonable care that they upheld sound journalistic
standards in both sourcing and reporting the story.

So as well as considering the public interest in the story,
The Court will also look at factors such as the reliability
of the sources and the steps taken to verify them and
whether the subject of the story was given the chance to
comment upon it and their side included in the story.

This approach, which is in harmony with that taken under
the European Convention of Human Rights, of course, grants
the media less freedom of action than in the US. But,
again, it is based upon the notion that what will best
serve the public interest and advance the aims of a
flourishing democracy is not simply unrestrained media
freedom, but responsible journalism. That, as the House of
Lords has said, when reputations are only tainted by the
media, society as well as the individual is the loser. As
Professor Berentas put it, the public has a free speech
interest in the publication of fair, well-researched
stories, not in those which are poorly put together and
which gratuitously destroy the standing of those in public

life.

Of course The court of public opinion often intrudes into
privacy also. Whereas in the US it’s been said that the
private facts taught us all but being demolished by the
First Amendment. Privacy law is flourishing in the UK. The
test in English law after the Naomi Campbell case is now
whether the claimant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information disclosed by the press,
something which depends upon the nature of the information
as well as all of the surrounding circumstances.

And of course with privacy the issue of verifying the story
doesn’t arise. So the question then becomes one of finding
the right balance between media speech rights and the
individual privacy interests. And it’s now established
following Campbell that the rights to private life and to
free speech are presumptively equal. The Court must assess
the relative way to the two rights in the particular
context. On the privacy side, this will involve examining
the degree of intrusion represented by the story. On the
expression side, it’s now what established that the key
test is how far publication of the story serves a genuine
public interest as opposed to merely interesting the

public, and whether it goes further than necessary in terms
of its revelation of intimate detail in serving that
interest. It may be legitimate for the press to reveal, for
example, that a Cabinet Minister is having an affair, but
to include details of exactly what went on in the bedroom
may be needlessly intrusive and not, in fact, serve the
legitimate interest that the press is claiming.

What will happen when publication have the effect of
damaging the individual’s reputation or invading his
privacy in the context of a forthcoming trial? Well, we’ve
not yet had such a case, but I believe that in such an
instance the fair trial interest will here join hands with
the interest in privacy and reputation. Because in
assessing the media’s claim that the article was in the
public interest, The Court will have to decide whether, in
fact, it was contrary to the public interest in the fair
administration of justice. If the article is really
prejudicial in addition to being defamatory, this will be
likely to prevent the media from successfully defending
cases in defamation or privacy. In this way the individual
may be indirectly able to vindicate their fair trial rights
against the media through private law without having to
rely upon the state.

To conclude, looking at the persistent refusal of the US
law to protect individuals from the prejudicial effect of
media coverage on their trials and their arrests by
restraining the media, when I look at this to me what is
going on seems to be the very opposite of American respect
for the individual and for individual liberty. Rather it
looks very much as if the individual and his or her freedom
and rights is being sacrificed to the commercial interest
of the media and the curiosity of the majority.

Cases in which a media pack fuel sales by consuming an
individual’s life and reputation and threatening a
miscarriage of justice cannot without perversity be
characterized as the exercise of a vital human right to
free speech, at least not without surrendering the content
and meaning of those rights to powerful commercial and
corporate forces of a kind which John Stewart Mill with his
famous defense of human liberty certainly never invisioned.

As Executive Producer, Jeff Fagar, said of the Duke
Lacrosse case there’s something that goes against the
American way when a pack rules. A shift from protecting the
pack to protecting the individual, rebalancing between the

First and the Sixth Amendments, to more surely protect the
famous of trials and the individual would not, I suggest,
betray liberty or the constitution but vindicate both.
Thank you very much.
BIGNAMI:

Thank you very much for that provocative intervention. Turn
over to Peter Jacobsen now.

JACOBSEN:

Thank you very much. I, too -- as Gavin has done -- want to
express my gratitude to the organizers of this conference
and I must say that rarely have I seen such a beautiful
place to put up speakers, and had I known, I would have not
take two seconds to accept the invitation. I would’ve taken
a millisecond.

I’m delighted to be here. I’m here to present the Canadian
perspective on these matters. We heard yesterday that trial
by media is as American as apple pie, and I guess in Canada
we prefer to do the trials more in a court of law. And I
don’t say that to be superior, but just to point out where
this is going.

Trial by jury is what we’re talking about, and in Canada
there are criminal trials that will be done by judge alone.
That is at the option of the accused in most cases. And I’m
talking about serious charges. Many of our criminal charges

that are not of much consequence they are done by judge
alone, and our courts have held that one cannot prejudice a
trial by judge alone by pretrial publicity. Many of the
judges I’ve spoken to aren’t so sure themselves. They’re
human as well, and if there is a large swell of public
opinion in one direction they admit that of course that’s
going to affect them in some way, but they say their
capable of putting that out of their mind and just deciding
the case on what is heard before them. So I’m dealing with
trials where there is a jury.

We say in Canada that trial by a juror who is capable of
putting what they have heard prior to being sworn as a
juror is as Canadian as Canada winning the international
hockey championship. I’ve heard that when I came here that
Canadians are regarded as being boring, to which all I can
say all 35 million of us, well maybe, but I want to tell
you one interesting fact that I’ve not heard here: lacrosse
is actually Canada’s national game. You know, how we all
have national flowers, etc. Well, because the native people
in Canada started lacrosse, it’s actually Canada’s national
game, so I figured that maybe one of the reasons I’m here.

It’s true that we don’t have the First Amendment. We do

have protection of freedom of expression in Section 2B of
our Charter of Rights, which I’m embarrassed to say only
came into effect in 1982. But at least we do have a
charter. We’re a little ahead of our British forefathers in
that respect, but certainly the British tradition and the
British system of fairness is what has been adopted in
Canada much more than the American approach to law. So we
watch your movies, we watch your television, but we use the
British law, more or less.

The freedom of expression in Canada is subject to
reasonable measures that are accorded in a free and
democratic society, so one can come along in Canada to say
well, yes, prima facia freedom of expression is abrogated
in this case, but the legislation is justified.

And let me give you an example. Naming of the complainant.
Now, yesterday I heard Casey Johnson on this panel talking
about the withholding of the name of an accuser and the
blogs in this case, in the lacrosse case, the bloggers had
named the accuser, and I don’t think he was particularly
suggesting that was a good or bad thing, but he was
mentioning that and saying that’s how that information got
out. Well, in Canada those bloggers could’ve been

prosecuted under the criminal code.

We took a case to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1988 to
try and set aside the section of the criminal code that
said “thou shalt under no circumstances name or provide any
information that would tend to identify the complainant in
a sexual assault case.” And this case was a case where a
wife had brought a criminal charge against her husband, so
obviously that the name of the accused, the husband was out
there, but we couldn’t even mention the fact that it was
the wife, because that would tend to identify her. And the
Supreme Court of Canada said, and I’m now going to do what
I tell my students and my juniors never to do, I’m going to
bore you by reading, but I’m Canadian, so I’m boring. The
Supreme Court of Canada said, “When considering all of the
evidence [available] it appears that of the most serious
crimes sexual assault is one of the most unreported. The
main reason stated by those who do not report this offense
are fear of treatment by police or prosecutors, fear of
trial procedures, and fear of publicity or embarrassment.
The section of the criminal code is one of the measures
adopted by Parliament to remedy this situation. The
rationale being that a victim who fears publicity is
assured when deciding whether to report the crime or not

that the judge must prohibit upon request the publication
of the complainant’s identity or any information that would
disclose it. Obviously since fear of publication is one of
the factors that influences the reporting of sexual
assault, certainty with respect to non-publication at the
time of deciding whether to report plays a vital role in
the decision. Therefore, a discretionary provision under
which the Judge retains the power to decide whether to
grant or refuse the ban on publication would be
counterproductive since it would deprive the victim of that
certainty. Assuming that there would be a lesser impairment
of freedom of the press if the impugned provision were
limited to a discretionary power, it is clear in my view
that such a measure would not, however, achieve
Parliament’s objective, but rather defeats it.”

That’s an interesting question. And I think it’s one that
we all might want to reflect on is whether even in an
extreme case, even where we’ve got a situation where the
woman has, as in the lacrosse case, it’s become clear that
it was a false report, do we want to create the uncertainty
for all other women who are coming forward that maybe it
will be found that her report wasn’t justified? And there’s
lots of times when the law is wrong or when we can’t prove

it beyond a reasonable doubt, is she then going to be outed
and is that going to make women much less likely to report
these? Supreme Court of Canada says yes. I think it’s a
matter of interest. I don’t think Canada and the United
States are that different on that question.

Now, with respect to pretrial publicity, we’re also very
different from the United States. In Canada, like Britain,
the closer you get to a jury trial, the more likely you are
to be found in contempt for polluting the jury pool. Now, I
don’t want to make it sound like this happens very often in
Canada, because we all know the rules, but one of the rules
is that we’re not to publish a prior criminal record after
the person has been charged. Before the person has been
charged, we’ve got liable concerns, perhaps, but a prior
criminal record, as Gavin has said, same in Canada.

So what do you do about the recidivist pedophile? The guy
that’s got out of prison for doing unspeakable things to a
little girl. In Canada we seem to let them out instead of
locking them up forever, but that’s another… Even when the
psychiatrist will say that there’s a 100 percent chance of
this person doing it again, 100 percent. We’ve had a guy
who was just let out. He had served his time. In any event,

he gets into the schoolyard two days after being let out
and he does it again. Are we really not supposed to report
the fact that he has a record for doing the same thing? So
what we’ve done, what I advise my clients, is we can hold
our heads up high if we go into court if anybody ever calls
us on it and say there’s a matter of social importance
here.

But if it’s a case of some kid breaking into a department
store and he was convicted three years ago of selling
marijuana on the street corner, then we’re going to say no,
no, no, no. It doesn’t have any -- there’s no social
benefit. We’re not advancing social debate in that regard.

Another example of things that we are not to publish are
confessions. Quite often people will come in and confess
and the reason that they’ve confessed is their arm was
being pushed very up high behind their back and perhaps the
confession won’t be admissible at trial as a result. We
have had a couple of cases in Canada where the media has
published confessions that were made at the time, almost at
the time of arrest or shortly after, and then courts have
said that this is not permissible.

What the Canadian courts are starting to do more and more
now is to look at the extent to which the jury pool has
really been polluted in the area in which the jury pool is
selected. So we’ve had a couple of cases where Calgary and
an Edmonton Newspaper were charged with having prejudiced a
fair trial and the Court of Appeal of Alberta actually did
an analysis of the extent to which those two newspapers
penetrated the jury pool and they found that there were
just a few dozen of the papers sold and on that basis the
newspapers got off. A dangerous game to play if you’re
representing as I do very often a national television
network, because TV goes everywhere, and it’s pretty hard
to say that you can’t penetrate the jury pool.

We don’t have a system of asking questions of any relevance
to perspective jurors. We get to know their occupation and
their name, and only in extreme cases will The Court allow
us to ask more questions. So we’re kind of stuck with those
people and sort of eyeballing them and saying oh, gee, you
know, it’s a middle-aged man and he probably doesn’t like
drug dealers, so no, we don’t want him, but we like that
kid over there. He’s young. That sort of thing. It’s very
imprecise and not nearly as useful as your system in terms
of the defense being able to figure out, and the

prosecution, being able to figure out what kind of juror
they’re really going to have on the jury.

We say, and I think it’s wrong, that jurors cannot put
these facts out of their minds and obey the judge’s
instructions. That’s why we need all of this pretrial
protection. I think that there have been ample cases in
Canada where we’ve seen that jurors are capable of doing
that. We had a case a number of years ago. Those of you who
maybe come from the northern states would’ve heard of the
case of Paul Bernardo who did some unspeakable things to
some little girls and the question is whether he actually
killed them or his then wife, Karla Homolka, had killed
them, and The Court was so concerned about the American
media’s coverage of this, because it was on America’s Most
Wanted and all of those lovely programs, and they actually
made an order saying any American news organization that
broadcasts that information into Canada will be held in
contempt. Well, if they’re not actually there, it’s not
going to help us, but there are a lot of American
organizations that have a base in Canada. With respect to
The Detroit Times, or whatever it’s called, they -- am I
wrong?
BIGNAMI:

Yes. It’s the Free Press or the news.

JACOBSEN:

The Free Press. I’ll take The Free Press.

BIGNAMI:

Okay.

JACOBSEN:

With The Free Press they said that you can only bring in
two copies of it into Canada per person. Now, why two? I
don’t know. So their concerned about this, and this all
gets us back into the internet, right? If you’re going to - right now we say the majority of jurors aren’t going to
be nearly as likely to have read something on the internet,
because you have to go and look for it, as they would if it
shows up in the globe and mail on their doorstep. But it’s
becoming more and more of a concern our ability to protect
jurors. And so some people in Canada are saying well, maybe
we should do away with the jury system. Others are saying,
no, no, jurors can do what they did in the Paul Bernardo
case. In that case we knew he had made these films of
torturing this girls, and we also knew that he was also
known as the Scarborough rapist, a whole other set of
criminal charges against him. But it was clear that he had
done it and everybody assumed he had done it. They managed
to impanel a jury in a day and a half and he got -- and the
defense counsel, who are very, very rigorous, they will all
say he got a fair trial.

Now, this was going on at the same time as your O.J.

Simpson trial was going on. And if there’s ever anything
that caused us to shy away from the American system and put
our arms around our British counterparts, it was that
trial. At that time we were really pushing for cameras in
The Court, and we were getting some place. At that time we
were trying to go and argue that New York Times insolvent
might be something that we want to adopt in Canada or
something similar. Well, O.J. and the appearance of the
lack of justice in that case and the spectacle of it which
revolted the Canadian judiciary, and I think many, cut that
off. So we run back into the arms of the British tradition.
We’re now looking, I’ve just argued in the Court of Appeal,
our courts should adopt the Reynold’s defense, which is
basically a negligence defense. We did everything we could
possibly do to get the story right.

Lastly I want to say I was a little horrified yesterday to
here the suggestion that when these young boys were under
suspicion for what had happened -- or apparently had not
happened -- that the University ought to have called them
in and interviewed them. Well, in Canada you don’t do that,
because you don’t want to, again, prejudice their right to
remain silent. So my advice to anybody who is in the
situation of those young boys is to follow the entreaty of

the great American songwriter Warren Zevon send lawyers,
guns, and money.
BIGNAMI:

Thank you.

DALGLISH:

Okay. Well, there’s just a little bit too much to work with
here. Listening to my fellow panelists, it’s almost as if
you would think we’ve got nirvana here for the media. We
get to publish whatever we want, we get everything we want,
we have no problems with the courts, the media rule the
whole criminal justice system. Well, I’m here to tell you
that that’s just not the case. I have an entire department
at the Reporters Committee we do nothing but work on issues
of secret courts and prior restraints. And we’re kept busy
all the time, because there are plenty of instances out
there where courts have taken action to make sure that the
media either doesn’t get access to something or issues what
we would consider to be a prior restraint on the press.

And I understand the idea that sometimes you just want to
kick everybody out of the courtroom, and sometimes you just
want to eliminate the media’s ability to broadcast whatever
they want. I’m quoted in the media all the time. I get
misquoted or what I think as being misquoted all the time.
I understand what it’s like to want to just wring their
necks.

Now, I think I’d like to give you little bit of law here
and then a little bit of perspective. I’m not a law
professor. I’m used to kind of talking to the lowest common
denominators, so please bear with me if I don’t sound very
erudite here.

But I think you have to keep in mind a couple of things
about where we came from here in the United States. We came
from a system that we viewed as being repressive. We were
rebelling against government authority. Among those things
that we were rebelling against were government secrecy, and
courts were included in what we considered to be the
government.

Historically in this country we have held our criminal
trials in a community, often small county based. You would
have a criminal trial. Everyone would know the accused.
Everyone would know the victim. Heck, some of the people on
the jury probably witnessed the crime. And we had this
notion that if you allow fair people to be fair-minded they
will come to a fair decision.

When I think of the American system of justice, I think of

the movie To Kill a Mockingbird. Gregory Peck is down there
in the well, in front of the bar. You’ve got all of the
black folks in the balcony, you’ve got all the white folks
in… but it’s a packed courtroom and everybody in that
community knows what happened. Everybody in that community
has a stake in the result. And Gregory Peck is standing
there with the jurors, of course they were all male, but
they’re sitting there talking about what’s impacting the
community, and what happened in that courtroom was part of
the news of that community, and it was very important for
the community to see what was going on.

I think the other systems that we’ve been hearing about
this morning make one assumption that I think is universal,
and that is that the only fair jury, the only fair and
impartial jury you can have is an ignorant jury. And here
in the United States we don’t make those assumptions.

When we deal with information coming about the courts at
the Reporters Committee we boil it down to two basic areas.
One is access. What types of information do you have access
to? And the other is prior restraints. Once you have that
information, what happens when a court or the judge or
someone else in the government tells you that you cannot

publish what you know and what you legally obtained? And as
one of your panelists at this conference will tell you that
if you issue a prior restraint, it’s sort of like poking a
sleeping bear in the eye. The media, in particular, will
come down on you and you might win, but there are very few
things that the media will rebel against harder than a
prior restraint.

There are a few things just basic law here in the United
States, since I know some of you are getting CLE credit, I
will give you some law. Keep in mind that when you talk
about the rights of the media or the right of access, we
are not talking about the right of the media. In this
country, it is the right of the public. To quote from a
case called Gannett v. DePasquale the United States Supreme
Court said in 1979, “Public confidence cannot long be
maintained where important judicial decisions are made
behind closed doors and then announced in conclusive terms
to the public with the record supporting The Court’s
decision sealed from public view.” And that’s kind of the
way the American system of justice works in a nutshell.

There are three sources of the media and the public’s
rights in this country. One is the old common law based

largely on the English system. One is the First Amendment
based rights of access. And another can be based on state
or federal statute.

Now, as we discovered in a case called Nixon v. Time Warner
Communications back in the late ‘70s, the common law right
of access is not all that satisfactory. We discovered that
it could be too easily overcome. So there was a case called
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1980. And I think basically
the period of time between 1980 and 1986 and perhaps the
late ‘70s and 1986 was sort of where most of the law of
public access comes from in the United States. There were a
series of cases where the result was very pro-openness.

The Supreme Court has made it very clear that in criminal
cases -- the Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving civil cases, so everything I’m going to say here
applies in criminal cases; although lower courts have found
that the same rules apply in civil. Under the Richmond
Newspapers, the Supreme Court established a two-part test
of whether the public has a right to access to a criminal
proceeding. The first prong is whether the place and
process have been traditionally open to the press and

public, and if the answer is yes, you go to part two. And
you ask whether the public access plays a significant
positive role in the functioning of a particular process in
question.

Now, since the Richmond Newspaper’s case, the US Courts
have extended this history and logic test. That’s what we
call it. The history and logic test. To establish a
constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings and
records. Now, when the First Amendment applies, the Supreme
Court has held that a presumption of disclosure requires
The Courts, and this is very important, you’re going to
hear this over and over and over again when you have
somebody in the media showing up in your courtroom, has
held that a presumption of disclosure requires courts to
grant access unless specific on the record findings
demonstrate that the closure is “necessitated by a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.”

Now, since that time after Richmond Newspapers, we had
other cases. The Globe Newspaper’s case also involving
criminal trials in 1982. Press Enterprise I -- which
applied to jury selection in 1984 -- Press Enterprise II

applies to criminal preliminary hearings back in 1986. In
ray Washington Post in the Fourth Circuit applies to access
to sentencing hearings.

So we sometimes find that that countervailing interest that
you can issue a closure order, countervailing interests
almost always these days applies to a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial. We are seeing some
instances since 9/11 where the right to protect national
security is applying more and more frequently.

But I know that we’ve only got another ten minutes, and I
know we want to get some discussion going, so I think I’m
going to skip the rest of what I had to say and just get
some dialogue going if that’s all right.
BIGNAMI:

Thank you very much.

SPEAKER 1:

(Inaudible) get their credit?

DALGLISH:

I don’t know.

BIGNAMI:

Thanks very much. Yeah. I’d like to open the floor now to
questions and comments on this issue of whether the system
as it stands now is fine and good, whether there are useful
suggestions from abroad, and please feel free to step in
and weigh in.

AUDIENCE:

A couple of questions. It seems to me maybe that there’s a

bit of apples and oranges. I think what I was hearing from
the folks from the other countries was talking about
pretrial publicity. I realize there are pretrial hearings
and what not. And I don’t think they were suggesting,
that’s their laws and they can correct me, limited public
information about conduct of the judicial proceedings
themselves. I think part of your (comments and I
(inaudible) my question is to the first three speakers is
it a fair trial or a fair trial to the defendant and are
pretrial comments that might prejudice the prosecution, the
State’s case, against the defendant, are they equally
forbidden or is there an unequal prohibition?

I guess the third question or comment: some people would
say I guess take this lacrosse case and talk about that the
media played a dual role. At some point it was very
prejudicial to the defendants, but after the first couple
of months I think it can be fairly said that at least
segments of the media, including the nontraditional media,
played a huge role in making the public aware of some of
the deficiencies of the case. I think the 60 Minutes Ed
Bradley’s presentation really made the public very aware of
the potential and ultimate as it turns out innocence of the
students, and I think it could be argued that because the

publicity was so widespread that now these students will go
through the rest of their lives they’ll be attached to this
case, but there will not be a sustained stigma that would
be attached to them and their careers that might have been
the case had there been no publicity and all that was known
is “okay, I was charged with rape and it was later
dismissed” or “I was later found not guilty with no one
knowing the way the people know now the particulars the
media (inaudible).” So a lot of questions I’ve posed. I’m
interested in your comments in any of those.
DALGLISH:

Can I say that the one case I mentioned, I think it was
Press Enterprise, does apply to pretrial proceedings, so
anything that you can watch during a trial we also have a
similar right of access to all records involved that are
publically filed or that are filed unless they are
specifically closed, plus all pretrial proceedings. And I
would argue that the fact that -- I agree with you that you
could make a very good argument because those pretrial
proceedings were public in the Duke case that a lot of
people believed that it did lead to the exoneration of
those young men, and I could point, if I had time, to a
number of cases in recent years where I think information
about those pretrial proceedings being released helped
exonerate some defendants.

BIGNAMI:

Mr. Resta, do you have any thoughts?

RESTA:

I just take a suggestion from your question about the
effect of prejudicial publicity on the investigation and on
the protection of the defendant. I think that is a topical
point that we should discuss and we should probably deepen
is the exchange of the information between the media and
the police and the prosecutors. So the point is not only
how the press will report on a criminal proceeding, but
which are the sources of the information of the press. And
I think it is a topical point.

I would like to recall a recommendation that we had in
Europe, the Counsel of Europe, in 2003 about the provision
of information through the media in relation to criminal
proceedings. In here are regulated all the way in which
judicial authorities, police, prosecutors should
communicate information to the media, and this, of course,
influenced the way in which the media reports about the
proceedings. In here it is stated that first of all the
opinions and information relating to ongoing criminal
proceedings should only be communicated or disseminated for
the media where this does not prejudice the presumption of
innocence of the suspect or accused. And then it is also
said that the judicial authorities should inform the media

about various essential acts so long as this does not
prejudice the secrecy of the investigations and police
inquiries or delay or impede the outcome the of the
proceedings. So we see here that our concern is with the
two points: so the secrecy of the investigation and the
presumption of innocence.

I think that we are facing, at least in Europe, a process
of what the German call (Inaudible), so (inaudible) of the
exchange of information through the media. For example, in
Italy in the last year it was said it was limited the
possibility for the judges of releasing interviews and
commenting upon proceedings, and this, of course, makes
some promise from First Amendment, from freedom of speech
perspective, but the concern is that we should give
information to the press. The press has the right to inform
the public. But the better the press informed this the more
accurate are the information the better is for the
investigation and for the defendants.
PHILLIPSON:

Just to answer your points in turn, yes. Open justice is a
very elevated value in British law, and, of course, the
public are informed everyday in terms of what went on in
the trial, what the evidence was led. So in other words,
there won’t just be the verdict announced without the

record. The record will show why the verdict reached the
jury it did and the public will hear all the evidence that
the jury hears. So in that sense open justice occurs.

Secondly to answer your other question, yes. Evidence -you can commit criminal contempt by being prejudicial
either way, so if you release evidence that would tend to
exculpate the defendant then equally you can be guilty of
contempt in that way.

Your third point about vindication of reputation. Well, all
I would say was under the UK while the statements made in
the press would not have been able to be made while the
charges were outstanding, but the moment that the charges
were dropped and the legal proceedings came to an end then
obviously the media and the boys themselves could make
press statements, and the media at that point could then
proceed to discuss the case and the boys’ reputation would
be exonerated, so there would be no long term difference.
In fact, in the case it’s merely a question of delaying
comment until the trial is concluded. So in that sense I
would argue another reason for prioritizing Sixth Amendment
rights over First or Article 6 over Article 10 is that in
one case the media’s rights are merely delayed, where as if

you damage the trial’s fairness then you’ve damage it
irreparably.
BIGNAMI:

Peter?

JACOBSEN:

I want to make one comment before I get to these and that’s
something that Lucy said that we are arguing that the only
fair and impartial jury is an ignorant jury. That certainly
is not the position in Canada. I don’t think it’s the
position of the UK either. What we want is a situation
where the jurors are capable of putting out of their mind
anything they’ve heard and only deciding the case on what
they’ve heard in court. And what the Canadian courts have
said, and is sounds like what the British courts say as
well, is that where you’re dealing with confessions that’s
awfully hard to do, so let’s not make it really hard for
the jurors. And where you’re dealing with prior
convictions, it might also be really hard to do in a lot of
situations. So I think that’s where they’re coming from.

But we’ve long, long ago recognized that the jurors are
going to know an awful lot about a case, particularly if
it’s a celebrated case. It’s going to be all over the
media, and the minute someone is arrested they’re name is
out there. Thank God we’ve caught -- the police will say,
Thank God we’ve caught the rapist that’s in the East End of

Toronto. Well, he hasn’t been found guilty yet, and so
we’re very careful to say according -- that’s what the
police say. But the jury pool has all heard it.

Yes, in answer to the question you can certainly be found
in contempt in Canada if you’ve jeopardized the Crown’s
case. In fact, we have many situations where the defense
sits back and they kind of like the fact the media might be
going a little bit crazy, because they are going to maybe
be able to do the one thing that will get their client off
and that’s argue that they can’t get a fair trial. That’s
never happened, but they keep hoping it will. And it’s
happened in the UK.

But what is interesting is the Crown in that case will come
forward and bring its own motion to prevent us from saying
things that they think will prejudice the fair trial in
favor of the defense.

So the last thing this business of the widespread the boys
in Canada would’ve gotten their chance to say that they it
would’ve been very clear that they were innocent and I
agree with the widespread press, but I’ve got to tell you
I’ve got a 20 year old daughter and I was telling her about

this case, and she said: “well, dad, yeah, that’s great
they got off and all that,” but she said “hiring a
stripper, that’s really sketchy.” So I think they’re still
going to have trouble with their reputation amongst a
certain group of people.
BIGNAMI:

We have time for one more question.

AUDIENCE:

This is a question on (inaudible). With the Hatfield case
and the Win Ho Li case it seems like the media is getting - where it’s becoming like the British case regardless if
the media is going to have to end up paying off civil suits
or give up sources because of improperly (inaudible). I’d
invite you to say where you think those kinds of cases are
going to go.

DALGLISH:

Well, that -- she asked a question about the Hatfield and
the Win Ho Li cases. Those are not criminal cases. Those
are civil cases where two government employees who were
being investigated by I believe it was the FBI, in one case
the Energy Department, for possibly engaging in illegal
behavior, while they were under investigation somebody
leaked the fact that they were under investigation to the
media -- they were both -- in particularly the Hatfield
case. Hatfield was a fellow who was being investigated as
the Attorney General said was a person of interest in the
anthrax investigation, you know, when they were mailing

anthrax to various locations around the US. Enormous public
interest in that case. The Win Ho Li case had to do with
the scientist from New Mexico who was being investigated
for possibly giving some sensitive information to the
Chinese.

Reporters got the information. Those two government
employees brought civil actions under the US Privacy Act,
which makes it illegal for the US government to release
personal information from their government held files. If
that happens, you have a right to sue for recovery of
damages if you are damaged because of that leak. So they
brought those lawsuits against the United States
government.

The judges in those cases said that they could only recover
if they could prove not which department it came from or
the fact that it came from the government, but which
individual within each department. The reporters were
trying to protect the identity of the sources in the case
of the Win Ho Li case. They were told to offer up their
sources, they said no, so they ended up participating in
the financial settlement with Mr. Li. The Hatfield case is
still pending. I don’t know what’s going to happen for sure

in the Hatfield case.

Among the credo of seek the truth and report if fully,
reporters in the United States have a very other strong
belief, ethical belief, that they need to protect their
confidential sources, so there’s also an issue of whether
or not these people, the fact that it was reported -- I
assume you’re getting at the pretrial publicity thing
whether or not these guys’ lives were ruined because they
were in the media.
AUDIENCE:

Yeah. I mean, I just think this is an example where
somebody is trying to get civil damages because
particularly in Win Ho Li most of the charges were dropped
(inaudible).

DALGLISH:

He pled guilty to a felony, but most of the rest of the,
yeah, the rest of the charges were dropped.

AUDIENCE:

(Inaudible) all of the charges turned out to be dropped for
whatever reason, and so he’s coming after the government
and in that case it ended up the press paid --

DALGLISH:

Part of the damages.

AUDIENCE:

(Inaudible).

DALGLISH:

In exchange for being able to keep their sources private,
yes. It was both very difficult cases. The Hatfield case,
like I said, we don’t really know how that one is going to

play out yet, but they have been ordered so far to reveal
their sources. I think is Judge Walton scheduled to be on
the panel later today? Well, you can ask him.
BIGNAMI: Well, please join me in thanking our panelists for a thought
provoking presentation.

